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1. Introduction 
In December 1, 2001, the Government Traffic Department of Taiwan increased the speed limit 
from 90 km/h to 100 km/h for the entire length of Freeway No. 1, and in 2008, increased the 
limit further of 110 km/h on the section between the Tainan rest area and the Nanzih 
intersection (detailed in Fig. 1).  The speed limit on Freeway No. 5 was also raised from 70 
km/h to 80 km/h on March 16, 2008. These higher speed limits were a consequence of freeway 
upgrading that enabled greater throughput of larger volumes of traffic. One consequence of 
these relaxed speed limits and greatly improved freeway performance was a noticeable increase 
is speeding. The Ministry of the Interior in Taiwan (2008) reported that speeding was the most 
common illegal driving behavior from 2001 to 2007, accounting for 63.8% to 77.3% of all such 
infringements. Speeding fines in Taiwan range from $US94 to $US1881
Despite all the warnings, drivers continue to speed in ever increasing numbers, mindful of the 
increased risks of a crash and injury (including fatality), and the implications on loss of income 
to the driver and society in general (Carcary et al., 2001). The desire to speed for some drivers is 
linked to them gaining personal satisfaction through risky behavior, and therefore by 
implication has an association with a willingness to pay (WTP) speeding fines as well as to 
cover expenditure caused by accidents.  
, increasing as the 
speed increment increases. These figures are the equivalent, on average, of 6.7% to 13.3% of 
average monthly personal income. 
Becker (1968) in an early pioneering study, focused on the relationship between illegal behavior 
and the associated penalties, with the results demonstrating that the cost expectations of drivers 
who deliberately speed are consistent with expected penalties2
Becker’s study, like those by Polinsky and Shavell (1979; 1991) and Chu and Jiang (1993), 
demonstrated that fines do not need to be raised to include all the risk-averse violator’s property. 
Therefore, to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement, we should consider stipulating 
speeding fines which are rational and lower than the average overall monthly income level of 
society. Above all, reducing illegal behavior not only depends upon law enforcement, but also 
upon the stipulation of rational fines. 
, and are lower than the 
expectations of drivers who do not take risks. In that study, illegal behaviors were assumed to be 
rational choices. In other words, personal illegal behaviors occur when the expected benefits 
outweigh the expected costs; otherwise, drivers obey the law. If an administration wants to 
decrease illegal behavior, then there are a number of ways to achieve this. One approach is to 
have a larger police force which may also be accompanied by increasing speeding fines.  
However, establishing the appropriate level of WTP speeding fines is a challenge given that it is 
a non-market good and there is no trading market in which to assess its actual value. In recent 
years, the contingent valuation method (CVM) has been widely applied to assess the value of 
non-market goods, with studies finding that CVM is one of the most efficient means of 
overcoming the difficulty of measuring risk and non-market goods. Several studies applied this 
method and developed discrete choice models of the logit form to investigate the WTP for 
goods and services such as improvements in environmental amenity and drink-driving 
behaviour, etc. (Liu, 1990; Fu and Jou, 1995; Lee, 1999; Bruce and John, 2000; Chen et al., 
2003 Liu and Lee, 2007; Liu and Lee, 2007; Yeh and Fu, 2007; Saz-Salazar and Garcia-
Menendez, 2001a). 
Given the real possibility in a context such as WTP speeding fines that many respondent’s in a 
CV setting may not be prepared to pay any money to obtain the preferred outcome, Kristrom 
(1997) proposed the ‘Spike model’ to deal with a large number of zero bids. The appeal of spike 
                                                          
1 $US1 is equivalent to $32 NT (Central Bank of the Republic of Taiwan, 2008). 
2 Becker (1968) defines the expected penalty as the probability of being caught multiplied by the level of severity (for example, the 
fine). 
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models was confirmed by Yoo et al. (2002), who suggested that spike models can reduce 
statistical bias when using data with a high proportion of zero bids (Yoo et al. 2006; Bengochea-
Morancho et al., 2005; Saz-Salazar and Garcia-Menendez, 2001b; Hu., 2006; Jou et al., 2011a, 
2011b, 2012).  
This paper develops a framework within which to obtain estimates of the WTP speeding fines.  
A spike model is estimated using data collected in a CVM survey.  
2. Model framework 
The framework proposed by Hanemann (1984), which introduces random utility theory in 
studies of contingent valuation, is used to investigate drivers’ willingness to pay speeding fines 
on a freeway,. The Hanemann model which assumes that the utility function is linear, with 
observed and unobserved components, showed that we can obtain the mean and median of the 
WTP starting from a dichotomous valuation question. Formally, the utility function of a freeway 
driver can be expressed as equation (1): 
 
 ( , , ) ( , , )U Y X Q V Y X Q ε= +  (1) 
where Y is personal monthly income, X is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics, Q is a 
vector of awareness toward the effects of speeding, and the error component ε is randomly 
distributed with zero mean. Where a driver prefers to accept the cost of speeding ( 1V ) rather 
than obey the traffic laws and pay nothing ( 0V ), we have equation (2): 
 
 1 1 1 0 0 0( , , ) ( , , )V Y A X Q V Y X Qε ε− + ≥ +  (2) 
where A is the monetary cost that the driver is willing to pay for speeding, and ε0  and ε1 are 
random components with an independent and identical (iid) Gumbel distribution. The 
probability of the driver accepting a WTP amount under a new condition (that is, accepting the 
cost of speeding) is as follows: 
 
 
1 1 0 0
0 1
Pr( ) Pr( (*) ) ( (*))
( , , ) ( , , )
Accept V F V
V V Y A X Q V Y X Q
εε
ε ε ε
= ∆ ≥ = ∆
∆ = − −
= −  (3) 
The argument * of V∆  is Y, A, X, Q. In addition, the driver will accept the payment of driving 
faster than the law allows when their WTP value is greater than the bid (A) offered in the CV 
survey. This probability of driver acceptance is given in equation (4). 
 
 
Pr( ) Pr( )
1 ( )
( (*))
WTP
Accept WTP A
G A
F Vε
= ≥
= −
= ∆  (4) 
where GWTP(A) is the complementary cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of WTP. The 
expected WTP is given as equation (5). 
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 0 0
( ) (1 ( )) ( ( (*)))WTPE WTP G A dA F V dAε
∞ ∞
= − = ∆∫ ∫
 (5) 
The domain of ( )WTPG A  can be defined as equation (6). 
 
 
0,                0
( ) ,               0
( ),    0
WTP
WTP
A
G A P A
F A A
<
= =
 >
 (6) 
where P belongs to the (0,1) interval and FWTP(A) is a continuous and increasing function such 
that FWTP(A=0)=P and lim A→∞  FWTP(A)=1. Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is used 
to estimate the binary dependent variable model, given its preferred properties over ordinary 
least squares (Bengochea-Morancho, et al., 2005). The maximum likelihood function is given in 
equation (7). 
 
 
[ ln(1 ( ))
(1 ) ln( ( ) (0))
(1 ) ln( (0))]
i i WTP
i
i i WTP WTP
i WTP
L M W G A
M W G A G
M G
= −
+ − −
+ −
∑
 (7) 
where M and W are defined as equations (8) and (9) respectively. 
 
 
1,  0
0,  
WTP
M
otherwise
>
= 

 (8) 
 
 
1,  
0,  
WTP A
W
otherwise
>
= 

 (9) 
Equation (3) can be further rewritten as Equation (10) given the assumption about the form of 
the functions 1V  and 0V . 
 
 ( )
1 01
1 0 1
0
0
(*) ( ) ( )V Y A Q Y Q X
A X Q Q
A X Q
α β δ α β δ γ
α α β γ δ
α β γ δ
∆ = + − + − + + +
= − − + + −
= − + +
 (10) 
In the spike model estimation, assuming that ( )WTPG A  is takes a logistical functional form, 
( (*))F Vε ∆  is defined by equation (11): 
 
 
1( (*))
1 exp[ ]
F V
A X Qε α β γ δ
∆ =
+ − + − −
 (11) 
 
Freeway drivers’ willingness to pay for speeding fines. 
Jou, Hensher, Chen and Wang 
 
4 
Furthermore, equation (6) can be rewritten as equation (12). 
 
 1
1
0,                                                   0
( ) [1 exp( )] ,           0
[1 exp( )] ,  0
WTP
A
G A X Q A
A X Q A
α γ δ
α β γ δ
−
−
<
= + − − − =
 + − + − − >
 (12) 
Substituting equation (11) and equation (12) into equation (5), the expected WTP is expressed 
by equation (13): 
 
 
0
0
( ) (1 ( ))
exp( )( )
1 exp( )
1 {lim ( ln[1 exp( )]
      ln[1 exp( )])}
WTP
A
E WTP G A dA
A X Q dA
A X Q
A X Q
X Q
α β γ δ
α β γ δ
α β γ δ
β
α γ δ
∞
∞
−>∞
= −
− + − −
=
+ − + − −
= − + − + − −
+ + − − −
∫
∫  (13) 
Kristroöm (1997) defined the spike value when A=0 (equations (14) and (15)) where equation 
(15) is a special case which does not take exogenous variables into account. 
 
 
1
1 exp[ ]
Spike
X Qα γ δ
=
+ − − −
 (14) 
 
1
1 exp( )
Spike
α
=
+ −
 (15) 
 
3. Survey instrument design and data analysis 
The design of the survey instrument, the survey methodology and the analysis of the survey data 
are presented below in sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. 
3.1  Survey instrument design 
There is no market or trade mechanism in existence to measure the WTP speeding fines for 
freeway drivers. Given this situation, we use a stated preference (SP) design of the contingent 
valuation form, to represent a hypothetical market in which to trade speeding fines.  
A series of background questions were asked prior to the main CV questions in order to 
establish a context for the CV exercise. Details were obtained on gender, age, education level, 
marital status, car ownership and personal monthly income of the each sampled driver, followed 
by questions to obtain trip details. Trip data included freeway usage frequency, departure city 
(county), time spent on the freeway, and whether this trip involved speeding on the freeway.  
Freeway drivers were questioned about their attitudes towards the law, which are used in 
identifying the WTP for speeding behavior. These questions are: 
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• What do you think is the probability of getting a speeding ticket when you are driving on 
the freeway? 
• What do you think is the probability of an accident occurring due to speeding? 
• If an accident were to occur due to speeding, what amount of compensation would you 
expect to have to pay? 
• Have you received a speeding ticket in the last year? 
• Do you usually speed on the freeway? 
• Do you know that the more a driver exceeds the speed limit, the higher the fine he or she 
needs to pay? 
• Have you ever turned right on red (this is not allowed in Taiwan)?  
• Have you ever made a phone call while driving? 
• Have you ever driven after drinking? and  
• Do you use your turn signal every time you change lanes? 
To investigate the effects of different speeding fine policies on drivers’ WTP for speeding, 
seven scenarios defining a range of speeding fines were selected, including the current fine for 
speeding ($US94). These scenarios were described as follows: “Will you speed3
3.2  Survey methodology 
 on the freeway 
if the fine is X USD?” (yes or no). Fines for the X (in $US) were 47, 70, 94, 117, 141, 164 and 
188, respectively, that is, -50%, -25%, 0％, 25％, 50% , 75%  and 100%  of the current fine. The 
respondent’s WTPs for speeding are the fines that the respondent answers as a yes. Each 
respondent has to complete all seven scenarios, yielding for 505 drivers a total of 3,535 
observations.  
The field survey was conducted as face-to-face interviews in the Sun Moon Lake national scenic 
area, an internationally-known sightseeing area, in the central region of Taiwan. This was an 
appropriate area for our survey since the majority of travelers (over 70%) driving to visit the 
area use freeways (Sun Moon Lake National Scenic Area Administration, 2007). The survey 
was conducted from 10 AM to 5 PM over three weekends (from June 21 to July 12) in 2008. 
The questions presented to respondents relate to freeway trips undertaken during the last 12 
months as well as questions to capture attitude towards the law and WTP bidding scenario 
responses. A total of 505 valid surveys were returned with only five refusals at the point of 
requesting an interview. The interviewers were trained to be able to explain all related speeding 
regulations and consequences (including the fines drivers would have to pay) to respondents to 
ensure that they fully understood the implications of speeding beforehand.  
3.3  Descriptive data profiles 
1.  Socioeconomic characteristics 
Socioeconomic characteristics are summarized in Table 1. The majority of respondents were 
between 26 and 40 years old with 41.5% single. 82.6% of drivers only had one car. The 
distribution of monthly personal income lies between $US626 and $US1,875 (74.5%), with an 
average monthly personal income for the sample of $US1,764. Most respondents (86.4%) have 
held their driver’s license for more than six years, indicating that the sample included mostly 
experienced drivers, that is, drivers with basic safe driving skills and an understanding of traffic 
laws. The car insurance fee paid per year was mostly below $US312 (53.9%).  
 
 
                                                          
3 The current fine ($ US 94) is based on situations in which speeding does not exceed the posted speed limit by more than 20 
km/h. More than 20km/h is not within our study scope. 
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2.  Trip characteristics and attitude towards the law 
On average, respondents used freeways 10.6 times per month. The proportion of drivers who 
reported speeding on freeways, 71.7%~76.9% of drivers, had a probability of speeding on 
freeways lower than 20%. Drivers who had not received a speeding ticket the previous year 
made up 81.4% of all drivers, 73.1% from the Taipei area, 86.6% from the Taichung area, and 
82.1% from other areas in Taiwan.  
A large number of sampled drivers (63.4%~66.7%) had made a phone call while driving; and 
the proportion of sample drivers who had turned right on red was also high (54.6%~66.2%). 
However, the experience of drink-driving was only 17.9%~22.2%. A high proportion of 
sampled drivers (75%~78.3%) perceived that the probability of getting a speeding ticket on the 
freeway was below 30% (including a high incidence of a zero probability). This suggests that 
the implementation of traffic laws on the Taiwanese freeways could be stricter. On the other 
hand, around 57%~94% of drivers perceived that there was only a 50% or lower probability that 
speeding on the freeway would be a main factor in a traffic accident. The reason for such 
answers may be the improvement in both the level of service on the freeway and car safety 
technologies (for example, ABS (Antilock brake system), TCS (traction control system) etc.; 
such equipment is widely used in cars in Taiwan). When an accident occurs due to speeding, 
80%~85% of sampled drivers expect to outlay only 10% or less of their personal income for 
compensation (the amount of compensation is $US867.5 on average). 
3.  Hypothetical market scenarios 
To measure a drivers WTP for driving faster than the law allows, seven different scenarios were 
designed. The statistical results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The results show that the higher 
the fine for speeding, the less illegal behavior occurs. 
Table 3 also reveals the changes in the percentage of drivers who would speed if the fine were 
changed (from the basic fine of $US94). The greatest impact is obtained by raising the fine for 
speeding to $US188 (associated with the number of speeding drivers decreasing by 
49.2%~59.3% in comparison with the basic fine), with around 18.3%~28.7% of sampled drivers 
persisting in speeding on the freeway. This reaction on the part of drivers to increased speeding 
fines suggests that increasing speeding fines might be effective in curbing some amount of 
illegal driving.  
Three market segments were analyzed to determine possible differences in WTP for speeding. 
These are personal income, the presence/absence of past violations, and driver characteristics. 
This study investigates two personal monthly income groups: (1) above average and (2) below 
average (according to the DGBAS4
Drivers were questioned about their previous freeway violations in this survey. We defined 
“past speeding violators” as drivers who had received speeding tickets on one or more previous 
occasions. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 5. The findings verify that past 
speeding violators have a higher WTP than those reporting no violations. This may indicate that 
past violators have become less sensitive to fines due to having received them in the past. 
, the 2007 average personal GDP in Taiwan was $1,406 US). 
Table 4 presents the statistical results, showing that drivers with a higher WTP for driving faster 
than the law allowed had personal monthly incomes which were above average, although 
different area segmentations were not statistically significant. 
We divided driver characteristics into three categories based oin responses to two questions: 
“What do you think is the probability of getting a speeding ticket when you are driving on the 
freeway?” and “What do you think is the probability of an accident occurring due to speeding?” 
These questions showed that a driver belonged to one of the risk attitude categories - the “risk-
seeking,” “risk-averse,” or “other”.  
                                                          
4 The Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) 
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Risk-seeking drivers were defined as drivers who perceived a lower probability (below 40%) of 
receiving a speeding ticket and a lower probability (below 40%) of having an accident due to 
speeding. Risk-averse drivers were defined as those with conservative driving behaviors who 
perceived a higher probability of receiving a speeding ticket and a higher probability of an 
accident occurring due to speeding (both above 60%). 
The driver characteristics under the different area segmentations are presented in Table 6. To 
summarise briefly, risk-averse drivers had the lowest WTP compared to other types of drivers 
across all scenarios. The average WTPs in the four area segmentations were $US25, $US27, 
$US35 and $US19, respectively. This result shows that risk-averse drivers are less willing to 
pay for their speeding fines. In contrast, risk-seeking drivers had the highest WTPs for all 
geographical areas ($US87, $US104, $US88 and $US80, respectively). 
Model estimation results 
The focus of model estimation is on the spike model given the incidence of a spike at the zero 
value response (i.e., 47% of participants had a zero WTP). The model is summarised in Table 7. 
Data for three market segments (the Taipei area, the Taichung area, and other areas (excluding 
the Taipei and Taichung samples)) and the combined sample are presented. All explanatory 
variables in Table 7 are statistically significant with the correct sign. The results indicate that 
drivers with higher personal monthly income are willing to pay higher speeding fines. The 
presence/absence of past violations, as a proxy variable indicating the total number of times the 
driver was punished for speeding last year, suggests that the greater the number of times 
someone is caught speeding, the higher the acceptance exhibited toward speeding fines; that is, 
the driver may not care at all about the amount of the speeding fine while he/she drives on the 
freeway. Risk-seeking drivers have higher WTP speeding fines. The reason is that these drivers 
are less sensitive to danger and the cost of speeding; and because they underestimate these 
factors, they are willing to pay more. Risk-averse drivers have lower WTP speeding fines, and 
their heightened awareness of cost and danger distinguishes them from risk-seeking drivers. 
Drivers with a higher percentage of time spent on the road where the driver was exceeding the 
speed limit last year, tended to accept higher speeding fines, indicating that the habit of 
speeding decreases a driver’s aversion to paying fines.  
The driver’s average WTP for speeding fines was $US51 in all samples5
The only other study we are aware of that has investigated the WTP for speeding fines is by Jou 
and Chen (2013). They used standard logit and probit models and obtained mean The WTP 
estimates of $US119 and $US116 respectively. The higher values of WTP can be attributed to 
the fact that zero WTPs were not taken into consideration. What this suggests is that the spike 
model is a preferred method to ensure that proper account is taken on the high incidence of zero 
values. 
, $US43 in Taipei, 
$US51 in Taichung, and $US53 in other areas. The spike value ranges from 66%~75% for all 
models, indicating that a driver’s WTP is not only determined by speeding fines, but also related 
variables. This study is consistent with evidence reported in Yoo et al. (2006). 
4. Conclusions and suggestions 
In this paper we created a hypothetical market and used contingent valuation to investigate 
drivers’ real WTP through a field survey. A spike model was estimated as a way of dealing with 
a high incidence of zero bids.  
The main empirical results can be summarized as follows, together with some policy-related 
implications on how the evidence might be of value in revising current fine practices.  
                                                          
5 Compared with another study by Jou and Wang (2012), the average WTP for speeding fines was $US23 for motorcyclists. 
Currently the actual fine for exceeding the speed limit by 20 k/h is $US40, 
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Drivers’ reactions to increases in freeway speeding fines are systematically related to personal 
income. A driver who has a higher income also has a higher WTP. This indicates that not only 
enforcement of the law, but also the stipulation of rational fines is required to effectively reduce 
illegal speeding behavior. For example, Finland sets fines for moving violations according to 
two variables: “severity of the violation” and “progressive income.” In the same way, income 
and past violation ratio variables can be further considered in policy making. Consistent with 
principles of social justice, fines for violating the laws increase as driver income increases. 
We find that risk-seeking drivers have a higher WTP than drivers with risk-averse 
characteristics, showing that the relationship between drivers’ characteristics and the amount of 
speeding fines is worth considering when drafting traffic legislation in the future. 
The results of the study indicate that adopting the spike model to determine the real WTP that 
drivers have in mind is one way to determine the value of non-market goods in transportation 
related research. 
The WTP values for speeding fines calculated by the spike model will be helpful in setting 
rational fines in the future. 
Instead of defining Q as a vector of awareness, one might use another variable “the difference 
between the chosen and stipulated speeds” to derive the indirect utility such that the optimal 
speed chosen and optimal fine paid by the individual can be determined. 
The spike model should be considered in future studies where there is high incidence of a 
specific value, which in our study is the zero response.  
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Tables 
Table 1:  Description of respondent socioeconomic characteristics (percentages in parentheses) 
Variable Item All 
 
Taipei Taichung Other 
 
Age Below 25 44(8.7) 12(11.2) 14(10.4) 18(6.8) 
26~40 314(41.5) 60(55.5) 85(63.5) 169(64.3) 
Above 41 147(29.2) 36(33.3) 35(26.1) 76(28.9) 
Marital status Single 332(65.7) 38(35.1) 45(33.6) 90(34.2) 
Car ownership 0 17(3.4) 4(3.7) 5(3.7) 8(3) 
1 417(82.6) 92(85) 114(85.1) 211(80.2) 
2 or above 71(14.1) 12(11.3) 15(11.2) 12(4.6) 
Personal monthly 
income (USD)* 
Below 625 21(4.2) 3(2.8) 6(4.5) 12(4.6) 
626～1875 376(74.5) 74(68.5) 108(80.6) 194(73.8) 
1876～3125 76(15) 21(19.4) 11(8.2) 44(16.7) 
Above 3126 32(6.3) 10(9.3) 9(6.7) 13(4.9) 
Driving license (years 
held) 
Below 2 15(3) 2(1.9) 3(2.2) 10(3.8) 
3～5 53(10.5) 10(9.3) 17(12.7) 26(9.9) 
Above 6 437(86.4) 96(88.9) 114(85.1) 227(86.3) 
Insurance Fee per year 
(USD)* 
Below 156 104(33.8) 66(66.1) 75(56.0) 160(60.8) 
157～313 62(20.1) 12(11.1) 21(15.7) 29(11.0) 
314～469 25(8.1) 5(4.6) 7(5.2) 13(4.9) 
470～625 45(14.6) 10(9.3) 11(8.2) 24(9.1) 
Above 626 72(23.4) 15(13.9) 20(14.9) 37(14.1) 
*1 US$ = 32 NT$, Central Bank of the Republic of Taiwan, 2008 
 
Table 2:  Sample distribution under different speeding fine scenarios 
Scenarios (USD) 
 
47 70 94 117 141 164 188 
All areas 233 31 46 41 34 19 101 
Taipei 44 3 10 5 9 6 31 
Taichung 59 13 9 13 10 8 22 
Other areas 130 15 27 23 15 5 48 
*Total samples are 505, Taipei samples are 108, Taichung samples are 134 and other area samples are 263. 
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Table 3:  Drivers’ speeding behaviour under various fines (percentages in parentheses) 
Fine 
 
All areas (%) Percentage 
 
Taipei 
 
Percentage 
 
Taichung 
 
Percentage 
 
Other areas 
 
Percentage 
 
47 272(53.9) -12.9 64(59.3) -5.0 75(56.0) -21.0 133(50.6) -12.7 
70 272(53.9) -12.9 64(59.3) -5.0 75(56.0) -21.0 133(50.6) -12.7 
94 241(47.7) 0 61(56.5) 0 62(46.3) 0 118(44.9) 0 
117 195(38.6) 19.1 51(47.2) 16.4 53(39.6) 14.5 90(34.2) 23.7 
141 154(30.5) 36.1 46(42.6) 24.6 40(29.9) 35.5 68(25.9) 42.4 
164 120(23.8) 50.2 37(34.3) 39.3 30(22.4) 51.6 53(20.2) 55.1 
188 101(20.0) 58.1 31(28.7) 49.2 22(16.4) 64.5 48(18.3) 59.3 
 
Table 4:  Two-sample t-test of WTP with respect to income 
area 
Above average income Under average income Two-sample 
t-test Samples WTP 
 
Samples WTP 
 All areas 164 84 341 71 1.76** 
Taipei 49 101 59 82 1.19 
Taichung 34 72 100 77 -0.34 
Other areas 81 80 182 65 1.46 
** Significant at 90% confidence level. 
 
Table 5:  Two-sample t-test of WTP with respect to past speeding violators 
area 
Past violator Driver with no violations 
t-value 
Samples WTP 
 
Samples WTP 
 All areas 94 115 411 66 5.60* 
Taipei 29 154 79 67 6.58* 
Taichung 18 109 116 70 2.19* 
Other areas 47 93 216 64 2.24* 
* Significant at 95% confidence level; **Significant at 90% confidence level. 
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Table 6:  WTP according to driver characteristics under different areas (percentages in parentheses) 
area 
Risk-averse Risk-seeking Others 
Samples WTP 
 
Samples WTP 
 
Samples WTP 
All areas 20(3.96) 25 333(65.94) 87 25(4.95) 57 
Taipei 6(1.188) 27 76(15.049) 104 5(0.99) 33 
Taichung 4(0.79) 35 87(17.22) 88 6(1.188) 63 
Other areas 10(1.98) 19 170(33.66) 80 14(2.77) 64 
 
Table 7:  Spike model estimation results (t-value in parentheses) 
Variables All areas Taipei Taichung Other areas 
Constant -0.841 
(-10.41) 
-1.109 
(-5.07) 
-0.686 
(-4.27) 
-0.832 
(-7.49) 
Bid (USD) 0.218 
(24.08) 
0.205 
(10.09) 
0.247 
(13.92) 
0.213 
(17.64) 
Personal monthly 
income (USD) 
0.036 
(4.84) 
0.066 
(3.65) 
0.006 
(1.45) 
0.046 
(3.35) 
Past violations 0.347 
(5.75) 
0.678 
(5.635) 
0.223 
(1.45) 
0.236 
(3.11) 
Risk-seeking driver 0.469 
(6.23) 
0.394 
(2.00) 
0.730 
(5.12) 
0.340 
(3.31) 
Risk-averse driver -0.961 
(-4.46) 
-0.693 
(-1.82) 
-0.662 
(-1.57) 
-1.333 
(-3.82) 
The proportion of 
times spent on the 
roads where the 
driver was exceeding 
the speeding limit 
(%) 
0.023 
(18.02) 
0.034 
(11.38) 
0.024 
(8.55) 
0.019 
(11.08) 
Samples 3535 756 938 1841 
Average WTP 
(USD) 51 43 51 53 
Log-likelihood -3034.944 -562.224 -829.143 -1608.715 
Spike 0.698 0.751 0.665 0.696 
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Figures 
Speed Limit
110 km/hr
 
Figure 1: The Taiwan National Freeway system 
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Appendix 
Attitudes toward the law (percentages in parentheses) 
Variable Item All samples Taipei Taichung Other areas 
Have you received a speeding ticket 
in the last year? 
0 411(81.4) 79(73.1) 116(86.6) 216(82.1) 
1 60(11.9) 18(16.7) 13(9.7) 29(11.0) 
2 24(4.8) 8(7.4) 3(2.2) 13(4.9) 
3 6(1.2) 2(1.9) 2(1.5) 2(0.8) 
Above 4 4(0.8) 1(0.9) 0 3(1.1) 
Do you know that the more a driver 
exceeds the speed limit, the higher 
the fine he or she needs to pay? 
Understand 219(43.4) 43(39.8) 64(47.8) 112(42.6) 
Normal 23(4.6) 4(3.7) 6(4.5) 13(4.9) 
Heard about that 22(4.4) 4(3.7) 4(3.0) 14(5.3) 
Never knew that 31(6.1) 13(12) 5(3.7) 13(4.9) 
Do you usually speed on the 
freeway? (%) 
100 41(8.1) 16(14.8) 8(6.0) 17(6.5) 
90 7(1.4) 0 3(2.2) 4(1.5) 
80 7(1.4) 1(0.9) 3(2.2) 3(1.1) 
70 5(1) 0 1(0.7) 4(1.5) 
60 4(0.8) 1(0.9) 1(0.7) 2(0.8) 
50 33(6.5) 5(4.6) 5(3.7) 23(8.8) 
40 11(2.2) 4(3.7) 2(1.5) 5(1.9) 
30 30(5.9) 4(3.7) 8(6.0) 18(6.8) 
20 62(12.3) 14(13.0) 19(14.2) 29(11.0) 
10 112(22.2) 25(23.5) 25(18.7) 62(23.6) 
0 193(38.2) 38(35.2) 59(44.0) 96(36.5) 
What do you feel is the probability 
of getting a speeding ticket when 
you are driving on the freeway? 
100 7(1.4) 2(1.9) 1(0.7) 4(1.5) 
90 7(1.4) 3(2.8) 0 4(1.5) 
80 12(2.4) 2(1.9) 3(2.2) 7(2.7) 
70 9(1.8) 3(2.8) 4(3.0) 2(0.8) 
60 8(1.6) 3(2.8) 0 5(1.9) 
50 60(11.9) 10(9.3) 18(13.4) 32(12.2) 
40 11(2.2) 4(3.7) 3(2.2) 4(1.5) 
30 71(14.1) 14(13.0) 24(17.9) 33(12.6) 
20 84(16.6) 19(17.6) 20(14.9) 45(17.1) 
10 179(35.4) 40(37.0) 47(35.1) 92(35.0) 
0 57(11.3) 8(7.41) 14(10.4) 35(13.3) 
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Attitudes toward the law (continued) (percentages in parentheses) 
Variable Item All sample Taipei Taichung Other areas 
What do you feel is the probability of an 
accident occurring due to speeding? 
100 8(1.6) 2(1.9) 2(1.5) 4(1.5) 
90 16(3.2) 4(3.7) 3(2.2) 9(3.4) 
80 21(4.2) 4(3.7) 7(5.2) 10(3.8) 
70 22(4.4) 4(3.7) 9(6.7) 9(3.4) 
60 15(3) 2(1.9) 5(3.7) 8(3.0) 
50 61(12.1) 9(8.3) 15(11.) 37(14.1) 
40 19(3.8) 2(1.9) 3(2.2) 14(5.3) 
30 39(7.7) 13(12.0) 7(5.2) 19(7.2) 
20 57(11.3) 17(15.7) 15(11.2) 25(9.5) 
10 134(26.5) 30(27.8) 39(29.1) 65(24.7) 
0 113(22.4) 21(19.4) 29(21.6) 63(24.0) 
If an accident were to occur due to 
speeding, what amount of compensation do 
you think is fair? 
300 18(3.6) 4(3.7) 4(3.0) 10(3.8) 
250 2(0.4) 1(0.9) 0(0.0) 1(0.4) 
200 15(3) 3(2.8) 4(3.0) 8(3.0) 
150 10(2) 1(0.9) 0(0.0) 9(3.4) 
100 22(4.4) 5(4.6) 6(4.5) 11(4.2) 
90 1(0.2) 0(0.0) 1(0.7) 0(0.0) 
80 7(1.4) 2(1.9) 3(2.2) 2(0.8) 
70 6(1.2) 1(0.9) 3(2.2) 2(0.8) 
60 12(2.4) 4(3.7) 3(2.2) 5(1.9) 
50 72(14.3) 15(13.9) 21(15.7) 36(13.7) 
40 29(5.7) 3(2.8) 6(4.5) 20(7.6) 
30 81(16) 18(16.7) 19(14.2) 44(16.7) 
20 80(15.8) 22(20.4) 18(13.4) 40(12.5) 
10 150(29.7) 29(26.9) 46(34.3) 75(28.5) 
 
